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Cheating is a major problem in online games, but solving this would require either a 
complicated architecture design, costly third-party anti-cheat, or both. This paper aims to 
explore the differences between preventive and detective solutions against online game 
cheating. Specifically, it explores solutions against software-based cheatings, what kind 
of cheats there are, and what proposed and implemented solutions there are. This paper 
was conducted using literature reviews as methodology, using relevant papers from 
databases such as ResearchGate, ACM, and IEEE. 
In this paper, it was concluded that a good prevention strategy during the game 
development phase is adequate to mitigate and prevent cheating but will require 
appropriate anti-cheat software to maintain fairness during the lifetime of the game. The 
importance of an online game’s network architecture choice in preventing cheating 
became apparent within this paper after comparing the benefits of each type side-by-side. 
Results showed that peer-to-peer architecture not having a trusted centralized authority 
means that the game needs to rely more on an anti-cheat software to prevent and detect 
cheating. This paper could not conclude what an appropriate anti-cheat software is 
because the topic is outside of the scope of this paper and lacks public data. Still, it does 
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1. Introduction 
What is the difference between cheating prevention and detection in any online game, 
which solves the cheating problem more effectively, and which one provides a more cost-
effective solution? This paper will aim to answer the questions mentioned above by 
conducting a literature review on software-based cheats and solutions. 
Online games have become one of the largest entertainment types in the world, and it has 
changed how people enjoy entertainment, and for some, it has changed how they live their 
life. One of those life-changing effects is esports. Esports, short for electronic sports, are 
a type of sport played on a video game platform, and like with any kind of sport, there is 
a form of competition. Like all sports that have passionate fans worldwide, these 
competitions can become quite fierce. Most of the time, esports takes the form of an 
organized, multiplayer, tournament-style video game competition. The prize money for 
the winner or winners can be as high as multiple million USD. The successful players in 
these competitions can earn their living by playing games and are thus called professiona l 
gamers. In some countries, these professional gamers are treated similarly to well-known 
celebrities from other entertainment industries or sports. Non-professional players hope 
to be recognized by a professional gaming team and live out their dream life. This 
recognition is one of the reasons why the competition among non-professional players 
can also be quite intense due to the aspiration of becoming a professional gamer. The 
aspirations and seriousness in these competitions create the need to ensure that the game 
is played fairly since some players might be motivated to cheat to win. With so many 
players competing, it is quite difficult to prevent and detect every player using cheats.  
Cheating has always been an issue in online games, but it has become a major problem 
in recent years. It has become so much of a problem that many games have opted to use 
third-party anti-cheat software or solutions. (Cano, 2016; EAC, 2018; Warren, 2020) 
These anti-cheat software are intruding on players’ privacy by scanning and analyzing 
the processes currently running on the player’s computer. However, some have gone 
beyond this by having functions to send files back to the anti-cheat’s server and remotely 
run shellcodes. (Battleye, 2016; The & Khanh, 2010.) In online gaming, the factors of 
large participation groups and high monetary reward entices cheating. Developers of 
online game cheats are benefiting from this economic opportunity. The practice of selling 
online game cheats may be an unethical way of earning money; it has nonetheless become 
a possible way to earn a living. (Maiberg, 2014.) Cheating has troubled many games and 
game companies because it ruins the experience of playing games and destroys the 
fairness of competition. Cheating makes some players leave the game, and as a result, the 
gaming company suffers financial loss, which eventually leads to the game’s decline. 
(Chalk, 2021; Warren, 2020.) Because of this, it is essential to prevent cheating and detect 
cheats and/or cheaters. 
Preventing cheating before it occurs would be the optimal solution, but realistically it is 
impossible to prevent every cheat and their usage before they happen. Thus, cheat 
detection is needed to prevent further damage after the cheating has already occurred. The 
development of anti-cheat software has come far, but so have cheating techniques, 
especially in modern online games (Cano, 2016). This results from modern online games 
being a software distributed to players who then interact with each other over the internet. 
With the increasing complexity within a game’s software and the interaction between its 
players, online games become more vulnerable to many different types of cheats (Mönch 
et al., 2006). Most types of cheats involve reading or tampering with the game’s code, 
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memory, and configuration data separately or any combination of the three on the 
cheater’s side of the game client (Yan & Randell, 2005). 
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2. Modern online games 
There are many types of modern online games, but the most popular types can be 
categorized as Massively Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG), Multiplayer Online Battle 
Arena (MOBA), First-person Shooter (FPS), and Real-time Strategy (RTS). All the types 
mentioned above of online games share the same basic qualities that make them 
successful: low communication delay, scalable architecture, and cheat and/or cheater 
prevention and detection. (Baughman et al., 2007; Webb & Soh, 2007.) While they all 
share the same qualities to be successful, the requirements to meet those qualities are 
different depending on the type of the game. For example, MMOG is a type of game 
where hundreds or even thousands of players share the same persistent world instances, 
hence the need for robust networking and scalable architecture (Farlow & Trahan, 2014; 
Webb & Soh, 2007). Whereas MOBA is a type of fast-paced game that has 2 – 10 players 
share the same world instances, which resets every time the match ends, but there is a 
massive amount of these instances, hence the need for low communication delay (Cassar 
et al., 2014). However, to meet those requirements depends a lot on the game’s 
architecture, therefore making the architecture of the game the single most important 
aspect of a successful game. Client/server (C/S) architecture and Peer-to-peer (P2P) 
architecture are two common architectures used in online games. (Webb & Soh, 2007.) 
2.1 Client/server 
C/S architecture has been popular among online games, especially in MMOGs. The 
advantages of this architecture lie in the control over the game and in security. C/S 
architecture has the ability for important things to be run and calculated from a trusted, 
centralized server. These servers send enough information for the client to render and 
update all performed actions, world instances, and the player’s character. A drawback in 
C/S architecture is that it has poor scalability due to the performance and network 
overhead increases in proportion to the number of concurrent players in the game. This 
flaw becomes apparent in modern online games where the players might be 
geographically far from each other. Therefore, a high network bandwidth and fast 
networking speed from the server is required. In C/S architecture, the playing experience 
is largely dependent on the server’s condition. If the server has high latency, is 
overloaded, or suffers from a hardware or system failure, the players will not be having a 
pleasant playing experience. Mirrored server environments aim to mitigate this problem, 
but it does not change the core fact that scalability is poor. (Baughman et al., 2007; Farlow 
& Trahan, 2014.) 
Mirrored server architecture contains many identical copies of the game servers, and 
players connect to one of them, ideally the one best suited for them. These mirrored 
servers connect to each other via internal network to sync their data across the servers. 
The latency problem is largely mitigated with the mirrored servers’ internal network 
being a lot faster than the player’s network. This will mitigate the issue of players being 
geographically far from each other while playing in the same game world instance. If 
there are enough servers scattered around the world or enough servers concentrated at the 
location with the heaviest network traffics, this will also mitigate server overload issues. 
However, having an abundant number of servers does not fix the whole problem. Instead, 
it creates an additional load known as server-to-server communication. Not only do 
mirrored servers need to send updates about players and the game world to the players, 
but it also needs to send the same updates to other servers to maintain consistency. Doing 
so creates an additional load on the network, thus increasing the cost of 
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operating/maintaining the game. (Baughman et al., 2007; Farlow & Trahan, 2014; Webb 
& Soh, 2007.) Compared to MMOG, there are no real needs to update changes about the 
world with MOBA, FPS, and RTS games because the game world instances are not 
persistent or shared with only a small number of players, making scalability issue smaller 
for those types of games. 
2.2 Peer-to-peer 
P2P architecture is an architecture without a centralized server where players, i.e., peers, 
are network nodes that directly send updates to each other. This is also sometimes called 
serverless architecture. P2P architecture increases the scalability and performances 
significantly because each connected peer increases the overall network bandwidth and 
computational power. Communication delays depend on how the P2P architecture is 
implemented; figures 1A and 1B illustrate this. In Figure 1A, each player is connected to 
a maximum of two other players, forming a ring between all players. For this scenario, 
the communication delay is determined by the player with the slowest connection speed. 
In Figure 1B, every player is connected, thus, making the communication delay the 
average of the connection speed of every player. (Cassar et al., 2014.) While the 
previously mentioned P2P techniques solve the scalability issue, it introduces new 
problems. One problem faced is the network strain on the player’s side when the 
network’s performance is tied to either the weakest link or the computed average among 
all peers. A new P2P technique is now being used to mitigate these new problems 
introduced by the traditional P2P architecture. This technique is called supernode or 
superpeer technique. (Schiele et al., 2007.) 
Superpeer technique is where a game assigns a virtual “area of interest.” This area could 
be a game area separated by a loading screen or the area around the specific player(s). 
Inside the area of interest, peers would act according to the traditional P2P architecture 
by sending updates to each other. Additionally, the game would then assign one player 
inside the area to be a superpeer. This superpeer would be the only peer who sends updates 
to the outside of the area of interest, thus creating a connection to all the other instances 
of areas of interest. So, instead of all the peers connecting to each other, the superpeers 
connect to one another and distribute the updates to the peers inside the area of interest.  
This technique gives an advantage over the traditional P2P technique in performance 
because the game can choose the player with the best connection speed to be a superpeer. 
Figure 1A – Peers having maximum of 2 connections  
to other peers forming chain of P2P network. 
Figure 1B – Peers connect to all peers forming mesh 
of P2P network. 
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(Cassar et al., 2014; Schiele et al., 2007.) However, this technique introduces a new 
connectivity issue when the superpeer is suddenly lost or disconnected. This issue can be 
mitigated with additional design to the architecture to account for the sudden drop of the 
superpeer. (Schiele et al., 2007.) 
All the benefits mentioned above do come with drawbacks because of how the sensitive 
and critical information is stored in a player’s device, and all calculations are done locally. 
It is quite easy to modify these values, and these modified values can then be sent to other 
players as valid and truthful values. Since there is no centralized authority, the detection 
is difficult because there is no way to determine which player data to trust (Prather et al., 
2017). Consistent algorithms can be implemented to prevent errors in the game and player 
states, but this will at best mitigate the problem (Webb & Soh, 2007). This is especially 
true in the case of when superpeer technique is being used because the superpeer will 
essentially hold authority over other peers in the area of interest. 
2.3 Hybrid 
Hybrid architecture is a combination of both C/S and P2P architecture. This architecture 
type aims to bring the security of C/S and the scalability and flexibility of P2P architecture 
together. In practice, this means that some workload will be performed on peers, but most, 
if not all, of the critical calculation and data will be performed on the server. (Baughman 
et al., 2007.) 
There are many ways to implement the hybrid architecture. One of those ways is to have 
the server act as a peer with more authority over data’s validity and consistency, and all 
of the peers will connect to each other and form a mesh. The server is there to verify the 
received data and distribute it further. This implementation will lessen the server’s strain 
compared to C/S architecture and will have improved control over the game compared to 
P2P architecture. This implementation can be further improved using the 
beforementioned superpeer technique used in P2P architecture. In this scenario, the server 
will always act as the superpeer instead of having one of the peers take on the role. The 
server’s strain will be further lessened, and the same security level will be kept. (Bethea 
et al., 2011; Buyukkaya et al., 2009; Cassar et al., 2014.) 
However, accomplishing the things mentioned above is a difficult thing to do. The 
difficulty arises from how complex the data distribution among the peers is and the 
complexity of how much is given to each peer without compromising the integr ity, 
consistency, or security. (Cassar et al., 2014.) 
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3. Cheats 
Cheating in modern online games can be largely categorized into two big categories: 
software-based cheating and non-software-based cheating. In practice, software-based 
cheats mean that cheaters have developed or obtained cheat software to be used on an 
online game to gain an unfair advantage over normal players. This cheat software could 
assist cheaters by showing any hidden information. The hidden information could be as 
small as seeing another player hiding behind the nearby wall or as large as showing the 
exact location of all the other players in the game world. For example, the cheater may 
react to specific things more quickly, like dodging attacks or initiating a counterattack by 
seeing the hidden information. (Cano, 2016; Yan & Randell, 2005; Web & Soh, 2007.) 
Non-software-based cheating means gaining an advantage without relying on a software 
or exploiting a game’s bugs, such as colluding and disconnecting before match round 
ends, thus avoiding loss. (Yan & Randell, 2005.) 
3.1 Software-based cheats 
There are many types of software-based cheats, and there are many ways to categorize 
them. Some ways to categorize these cheats are by their nature, such as automation, 
visualization, modification, and exploitation; by their capabilities such as reading and 
modifying a game’s data or memory; and by how they gain access to a game’s data 
memory/functions, external memory reading, and internal code injection/hooking. (Cano, 
2016; Yan & Randell, 2005.) While how cheat software gains access to the game’s 
data/memory is out of the scope of this paper, we will explore cheat software’s nature and 
capabilities because it will be important in the context of prevention and detection of 
cheat software. 
Automation cheats are those that automatically do something for the cheater. This type 
of cheat could be something as simple as macros that repeatedly left-click a specific 
position on the screen to activate an activity in the game while the cheater is not present 
in front of the gaming device, gaining in-game items while not playing the game. It could 
also be as complicated as mimicking the human’s mouse movement, such as non-linear 
and non-smooth acceleration/speed of mouse movement to assist in aiming at the enemy 
in FPS type of online games. In the context of cheating in online games, automation has 
no obvious limitation of what can be achieved. For example, a complex automation 
software suite (bot) can be developed to play the entire game for you from the beginning 
until the end. (Cano, 2016; Yan & Randell, 2005.) 
Visualization cheats reveal hidden information to the cheater. This hidden information 
could be stealth enemies that could not be seen normally; details of the enemies such as 
health, weapons, and/or ammunitions; and/or game world’s hidden information such as 
next event’s details and enemies’ spawn timings. Visualization cheats have a strict 
limitation of what it can achieve because what information the game client does not have 
cannot be revealed. (Cano, 2016; Moffatt et al., 2011; The & Khanh, 2010; Yan & 
Randell, 2005.) 
Modification cheats modify how the game works. In some cases, this means modifying a 
cheater’s game character to have better attributes or prevent a specific attribute from 
falling below a specific level. These modifications could be freezing or giving infinite 
health points, giving more movement speed than normally possible, preventing 
ammunition from decreasing, etc. (Cano, 2016; The & Khanh, 2010; Yan & Randell, 
2005.) 
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Exploitation cheats are a cheating activity that involves exploiting the flaws or bugs 
within a game design to achieve an unfair advantage. This exploit can be software-
assisted, but it is not necessary. For example, there could be an exploit to duplicate a 
game’s item. This exploit can be made more effective for a cheater by making a macro 
that automatically duplicates the item as fast as possible. (Yan & Randell, 2005.) 
Before any cheat software can do automation, modification, or visualization, it will need 
to somehow access the game’s information. This is, in most cases, done with reading the 
device’s memory section allocated for the game. By reading the game’s memory, a cheat 
software could display any hidden information within the game’s code yet not visually 
displayed. This results in visualization cheats. The cheating software could also read the 
location of a game’s objects which can be used to automate things by simulating the 
mouse movements and keyboard keypresses. This results in automation cheats. (Cano, 
2016; The & Khanh, 2010; Yan & Randell, 2005.) 
Reading a game’s memory might not be enough to achieve some of the things that 
cheaters want to achieve, thus making memory modification the next step in software-
based cheats. Adding memory modification capability to a cheat software will not only 
make modification cheats possible, but it will also make a greater level of automation 
possible. This greater automation level comes from the ability to directly invoke the 
game’s code to interact with the game’s objects, such as attacking or casting spells. (Cano, 
2016; The & Khanh, 2010.) 
3.2 Non-software cheats 
Non-software cheats are the more “classical” way of cheating. Some examples of non-
software cheats include cheating by colluding, match-fixing, “boosting,” and 
intentionally disconnecting during the game (Yan & Randell, 2005). While not as game-
breaking as software-based cheats, non-software cheats still negatively impact normal 
players due to the unfairly gained advantage or status. (Blackburn et al., 2014.) 
Collusions as a non-software cheat in any online game have been widely seen in recent 
years. Collusions happen most often in online games that have a limited number of players 
interacting with each other simultaneously, like in MOBA, FPS, or RTS. A common 
collusion is when two or more players conspire to have a secret alliance until they are the 
only ones left in Free-For-All (FFA) game mode. (Yan & Randell, 2005.) 
Match-fixing is when two or more players/teams have decided beforehand which one of 
them will win the match. The teams will proceed to play the match in a way that will 
favor the player/team they chose to win without letting any spectators notice. Match-
fixing usually has monetary motives involved. For example, Team A decides to pay Team 
B to make them intentionally lose the match, Team A, an underdog, and Team B, the 
tournament’s favorite. Team A then proceeds to bet using third-party personnel that Team 
A will win in the gambling platform. With large odds against Team A winning, the money 
obtained by this match-fixing can be a lot more than what Team A would obtain through 
legitimate means in the tournament. (Yan & Randell, 2005.) 
Boosting is where a player hires or lets a more skilled player play on their account to 
achieve a better ranking while pretending to achieve everything by themselves. 
(Blackburn et al., 2014.) If the game has a ranking system, the boosted player often ruins 
other players’ experience because they have attained a rank that does not suit their skill 
level, thus lowering the match quality for other players. Boosting is considered cheating 
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due to breaking the game’s term of services, most if not all of the online games prohibit 
account sharing in any form. (Blackburn et al., 2014; Yan & Randell, 2005.) 
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4. Prevention 
Cheat prevention is a challenging task that has to be taken into consideration at all levels, 
from design to maintenance, to achieve the best possible result. The reason is that no 
matter how good cheating prevention measures are taken in the maintenance phase, it will 
always be inferior to having a good design that takes cheat prevention into consideration. 
Preventing cheats at a design level costs much less than preventing cheats after the game’s 
release. (Baughman et al., 2007; Bethea et al., 2011; Chambers et al., 2005; Mönch et al., 
2006.) 
Even when cheat prevention is taken into consideration in every phase of the game’s 
development, there might be things that could not be anticipated. There might be things 
that by taking cheat prevention measures would require unreasonable overhead from the 
game, such as the network bandwidth. The cost in either the development or maintenance 
phase might also be too high for such preventive measures. This cost creates the need to 
have an anti-cheat system that could be continuously developed even after the game is 
released and continues to work independently from the game. (Bauman & Lin, 2016; The 
& Khanh, 2010.) Many online games develop their own anti-cheat system, but most 
online game developers buy a license to use or integrate third-party anti-cheat system into 
their games. Currently, the most popular online games use third-party anti-cheat systems 
such as BattlEye (BE) and EasyAntiCheat (EAC) (SteamDB, 2013). 
4.1 Solutions 
There are many solutions to prevent cheats, but they can be categorized into server-side 
and client-side solutions. Server-side solutions simply mean that those solutions are 
deployed in the server, such as server-side verification or minimizing information 
exposure to players. Client-side solutions are deployed with the game’s client, those 
solutions usually involve anti-reverse engineering, anti-hooking, and/or anti-code 
injection. (Bauman & Lin, 2016; Bethea et al., 2011; Chambers et al., 2005; The & 
Khanh, 2010.) 
4.1.1 Server-side 
The server-side solution will not work in P2P architecture due to the nature of serverless 
architecture. Also, server-side solutions introduce an additional strain to the server, 
making scalability even worse than before. (Baughman et al., 2007; Bethea et al., 2011; 
Chambers et al., 2005; Moffatt et al., 2011.) 
Server-side verification means that some or all of the game client’s actions need to be 
verified by the server before the actions take place or become permanent. In practice, this 
often means that an update to critical data such as health points will be checked by the 
server whether the update is valid or not. This could also mean that the critical 
calculations such as movement speed are being checked/calculated from the server. For 
example, the server receives an update on player A’s location, and in the next update, 
player A’s location was drastically changed. The server will check whether this change 
could be made without cheating and then will take appropriate action. (Bethea et al., 2011) 
In theory, this could prevent anything that modifies the game client to achieve unfair 
actions/interactions. However, due to computational power, network speed, and 
bandwidth limitations, it is realistically impossible to verify everything. 
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While server-side verification can prevent many cheats, especially modification cheats, it 
will still not prevent visual cheats. For example, the “wallhack” allows a cheater to see 
another player through the wall. To prevent or minimize the effect of such cheats is to 
minimize the information exposure to game clients. The server should not send any 
information that the client does not need to them. Even though the idea itself is simple, 
the implementation is not. To know what information the client needs will depend on the 
genre of the game and how much overhead the server has. For example, an FPS game 
might have a valid reason to send information about the enemy behind the wall if the 
current gun can penetrate the wall. However, it could also be hidden, and if the player 
decides to shoot the wall, the server will calculate whether that shot will hit the enemy 
behind the wall or not.  (Chambers et al., 2005; Moffatt et al., 2011.) 
The server-side solution will increase the development cost because of added works and 
testing that needs to be done. This will also greatly increase the cost of 
operating/maintaining the game due to the need for increased computational power and 
network speed/bandwidth in the server. 
4.1.2 Client-side 
Every software-based cheat starts from reverse-engineering the game’s code except 
certain cheat types that scan for specific pixels to gain information from the game. The 
reason is that the cheat software needs to be somehow aware of the game’s world. The 
game’s code needs to be protected to prevent or make it harder for cheat developers to 
create cheats for the game; this is known as anti-reverse engineering. For this reason, 
most of the games or third-party anti-cheat solutions use anti-reverse engineer techniques. 
These techniques may include control flow hiding, code encryption, code virtualizat ion, 
and/or packing. Having an anti-reverse engineer system is generally a good idea, even for 
offline games, because it will help with the unauthorized distribution of the game. 
(Bauman & Lin, 2016.) However, just protecting the game code is not sufficient since not 
only is it not effective enough, but it is also hard to update/improve afterward. 
To further protect the game from software-based cheats, the anti-cheat system needs to 
protect the memory segment that stores the game client’s data. Protecting the game’s 
memory segment is challenging because the anti-cheat system needs to essentially protect 
the memory segment in an untrusted environment while still giving access to the game 
client. This task is more difficult if the game is cross-platform due to different levels of 
exposure and access to a low-level application programming interface (API). For this 
reason, the main focus will be on Windows-based solutions because Windows is the most 
used operating system (OS) for online gaming purposes, that is, if you do not count mobile 
and console games. The currently proposed and implemented solutions to protect the 
game’s memory segment are to prevent blacklisted (or only allow whitelisted) processes 
from accessing the memory segment; elevate the game process’s level so that it would 
require at least kernel-level of access to read/modify the game’s memory or hide the 
game’s process from Windows process list. In Windows environments, this can be done 
by hooking into the lowest-level (ring0) API. (The & Khanh, 2010.) Over the years, 
protecting the software’s memory has had improvement, with the latest one having the 
most promise for wide adoption was Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX). SGX 
provides a user-level code in an isolated region of memory protected from processes 
running at higher permission levels or with lower ring access. However, this feature falls 
short because it is only available on Intel processors, specifically on Intel Skylake or 
newer. (Bauman & Lin, 2016.) 
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Developing a complex and extensive anti-cheat system is quite costly; therefore, most 
game developers or publishers tend to buy a license or contract an anti-cheat company to 
deploy their anti-cheat solution. For this reason, anti-cheat solutions are made in a way 
that requires little action from the game developers. However, this does not stop cheat 
developers from finding a way to bypass, exploit vulnerabilities and develop a cheat 
application, therefore creating an arms race between the cheat developer and the anti-
cheat developer. (Robles et al., 2008; The & Khanh, 2010.) 
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5. Detection 
Sometimes, it is hard to differentiate between cheat prevention and detection. In this 
paper, detection will be defined as detecting a successful cheating action and preventing 
further cheating with the same cheat software. 
Cheat detection is often underestimated in an anti-cheat discussion even when studies 
show that with limited resources, the best strategy is to invest more into detection than 
prevention. This is mostly because game experiences and/or reputations have been ruined 
before cheating is successfully detected. Detection is more of damage control than 
damage prevention due to the nature of current cheat detection techniques. Nonetheless, 
cheat detection is still important because it is realistically impossible to prevent all 
cheatings perfectly. (Barreto et al., 2017) 
5.1 Solutions 
Cheat detection can be divided into detecting cheat software and statistical/behavio ra l 
analysis to detect cheaters. Cheat detection is not as straightforward as cheat prevention 
due to the nature of the ever-evolving cat-and-mouse game that cheat developers and anti-
cheat developers have. Efforts have been made to stop this cat-and-mouse game by 
instead of analyzing the statistic and behavior of the players to detect cheaters, but those 
have been proven to be difficult to implement and prone to false positives (Alkhalifa, 
2016; Chapel et al., 2010; The & Khanh, 2010.) 
5.1.1 Detecting cheat software 
Once again, this section will focus only on Windows-based solutions for the reasons 
mentioned in the “Prevention - Client-side” section. The current proposed and 
implemented solution is to have a hook in the ring0 API that gets called every time a new 
process is created or tries to get the handle for the game’s process. The process or the file 
will then be analyzed. If the process is found to be suspicious, the details and possibly the 
file that created the process will be sent to an anti-cheat expert for further analysis. Once 
the expert has determined the process or file to be a cheat software, the code signature or 
file hash will be added to the blacklist to prevent any further cheating with the same cheat 
software. (The & Khanh, 2010.) Anti-cheat developers could also acquire the cheat 
software like cheaters do. For example, an anti-cheat developer could download cheat 
software from public sources or buy it from private cheat developers. After that, they can 
analyze it and then blacklist it. 
This solution is expensive and, most of the time, ineffective. This is because of the need 
to manually analyze the process or file and sometimes manually acquire the cheat 
software to be analyzed. Also, it is easy to bypass this type of detection due to how a 
cheat software gets blacklisted by code signature or file hash. Thus, it depends on how 
strict the scans are; it could be easily bypassed by modifying the code of cheat software. 
On the other hand, if the scans are too loose, it will produce false-positive results. 
There have been proposed solutions that are hardware-based, but those have the same 
limitation as Intel SGX’s solution in cheat prevention, thus resulting in poor adoption 
(Feng et al., 2008). However, hardware-based solutions might be a good solution for 
esports tournaments where a small number of players are competing, and the hardware 
used to play the game is owned by a single company. This is, however, out of this paper’s 
scope. 
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5.1.2 Detecting cheaters by statistic 
Currently proposed and implemented statistic-based detection solution analyzes either the 
player’s overall statistics or the game’s specific events. Win rate, headshot percentage, 
and online time are usually included when analyzing the player’s overall statistics. Mouse 
movement before/after kills and reaction time are usually looked at when it comes to the 
specifics of the game. (Chapel et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2012.) 
Statistic-based detection depends on the modeling of the game and cheaters to 
differentiate between cheaters and legitimate players. This means that before the detection 
can be implemented, a set of data has to be collected, and models have to be made. It is a 
costly operation, and the result will be tied to that specific game the models are made for, 
thus making statistic-based detections not well adopted in the gaming industry. Artific ia l 
intelligence (A.I.) based solutions have been proposed and used in recent years, such as 
machine learning. These A.I.-based solutions have the potential to be more accurate than 
traditional human-made models and produce fewer false positives. These solutions will 
not fix the fundamental problem with statistic-based detection. If the specifics of statistic 
models are exposed or leaked, the cheaters can effectively avoid detection by software or 
gameplay style means. (Alkhalifa, 2016; Chapel et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017.) 
Statistic-based detection is prone to false positives because all of it is probabilities. It is 
up to the implementer to decide at what percentage it becomes beyond reasonable doubt 
that the player is cheating. Therefore, most of the proposed and used solution includes 
manual reviews by humans at some point before the decision is made whether the player 
is cheating or not. This will introduce human error to the system, but it will mitigate if 
not eliminate the systematic error by statistic-based detection completely. (Barreto et al., 
2017; Chapel et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2012.) Having a manual review at 
any point of the time in a cheat detection system will increase the cost of operating the 
system and greatly decrease the scalability of the anti-cheat system because of labor costs. 
Some solutions use statistic-based detection to flag potential cheaters and have other 
players do a majority vote whether the player cheated or not. (Lahti, 2018; Valve, 2016.) 
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6. Discussion 
Software-based cheats cause the most damage in online games when it comes to cheating 
because it is often a game-breaking level of abuse, and it can be done on a large scale. 
But no matter how carefully a game is designed, how much cheat prevention and detection 
are taken into consideration; there will always be cheat developers motivated enough to 
find the way to cheat (Barreto et al., 2017). Game design that doesn’t unnecessarily make 
the game more prone to cheating is the cheapest and most effective way to prevent 
cheatings. If a lot of effort is put into a game design that is cheat resistant, it will lower 
the required investment to other kinds of cheat prevention and detection afterward. For 
example, having unencrypted network communication and unminimized information 
exposure to the client will enable visualization cheat and enable cheat based on a Man-
In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. Essentially, cheaters can have a software to parse the 
network packets from servers and get the exact location of other players, which results in 
a virtually undetectable cheat because the parser could be running on another computer 
completely isolated from the game and anti-cheat software. At the minimum, the game 
design should at least minimize information exposure, encrypt network communicat io n, 
and implement server-side verification if C/S architecture is being used. This will, at 
minimum, minimize the advantage gained from visualization cheats and make 
modification cheats unusable. 
Game code and memory segment protection will further make it harder for cheat 
developers to develop cheats. Developing a robust and reliable anti-cheat system is 
challenging and costly. Thus, buying a license to use an anti-cheat system or contract an 
anti-cheat company to develop an anti-cheat system is reasonable depending on the cost 
of such license or contract. This, however, can have a backlash effect from the players 
within games due to the nature of the techniques used by the anti-cheat system (Rawda, 
2020). Some of the techniques used by an anti-cheat company are controversial, such as 
hooking into Windows’ ring0 API “NtCreateFile” and sending a sample of the suspicious 
process back. NtCreateFile API gets called whenever any process tries to create or open 
a file (The & Khanh, 2010). Furthermore, the aggressive nature of these techniques has 
caused problems to the players’ system, such as Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) (Gonzalez, 
2018). 
Such capabilities raise users’ privacy protection questions such as what information is 
being specifically collected and how the user’s information is protected. This topic has 
been one of the most debated topics in gaming communities recently, and for a good 
reason. Some anti-cheat system companies have stated that they will not collect 
information unrelated to cheating and will not sell players’ information (Battleye, 2016, 
The Riot Security Team, 2020). However, there have been many scandals related to 
privacy and internet neutrality in recent years, that this statement holds little to no 
meaning. Even if this statement holds true, it still does not change the fact that there is 
potentially a major vulnerability in a player’s computer. If an anti-cheat system’s server(s) 
is compromised either by an external attacker or a rogue employee, the privacy of its users 
will also be compromised. In the worst-case scenario, controls of the anti-cheat system 
get compromised, and then attackers could potentially steal any kind of data from the 
user’s system. 
Investing heavily in the game design, such as minimizing information exposure; 
underlying architecture, such as mirrored C/S architecture; and adding an appropriate 
third-party anti-cheat system seems to be the most cost-effective and optimal way to 
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protect online games from cheaters. The question remains, what does an appropriate third-
party anti-cheat system mean? If everything is measured by gain and loss in financ ia l, 
having a good anti-cheat system might not be optimal. For example, the current game 
with the highest all-time peak of concurrent players online in Steam gaming platform is 
PlayerUnknown’s Battleground (PUBG). This game uses BE as an anti-cheat system. 
Battleye, which is currently is one of the most used anti-cheat systems. For example, out 
of the top five non-free-to-play online games in SteamDB’s (2013) charts of most played 
games; two games use BE, the rest either use their proprietary anti-cheat system or do not 
use any known anti-cheat system. BE has generated controversy on the internet due to the 
techniques used (Douggem, 2014). It has the capability to block access to a game ’s 
process (thus requiring cheat software to also be operating in ring0); send back files to its 
server; and remotely execute shellcodes in the player’s system.  
While BE has a lot of capabilities to prevent and detect cheats, it is however not perfect. 
There have been reports in 2017 by PUBG and BE that state that they have a daily ban 
rate of 6000 - 13000 (Duwe, 2017). This means thousands of cheaters have, one way or 
another, ruined a normal player’s experience before getting banned, and since it is a daily 
ban rate, the normal players’ experiences continue to be ruined the next day. But if taken 
into consideration that cheaters also have to, one way or another, get a new copy of the 
game before they can cheat again due to bans on their previous accounts. In that case, it 
is a reasonable assumption that the cheaters themselves generate quite a lot of income for 
the game developers/publishers. However, without the game’s internal statistics of bans 
and revenues, it is impossible to say for sure whether it is profitable for game developers 




What is the difference between cheating prevention and detection in any online game, 
which solves the cheating problem more effectively, and which one provides a more cost-
effective solution? Prevention is done at the game or architecture design level, and it can 
only truly prevent few types of cheats, but it will be really effective in preventing those. 
Detection is done after the game has been published, it can be continuously developed, 
unlike prevention which will be hard to add after the game has been published. Every 
type of cheats can be detected but depending on the detection method and cheat type, it 
will be more effective to prevent than detect. Implementing server-side verificat ion, 
minimizing information exposure to the game’s client, and deploying a third-party anti-
cheat system is the optimal way from the cost and effectiveness perspective. If there are 
not enough resources to invest in both prevention and detection, investing more into 
detection is more effective due to the nature of detection methods and the various types 
of cheats it can detect. 
Many different questions, cheat types, and anti-cheat solutions were left unexplored in 
this paper due to a lack of resources and scope of this paper. It could be interesting to 
explore how much cheaters negatively affect normal players and which types of cheat 
brings the most harm to the game. 
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